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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The objectives of this paper are to analyse both individual and overall performance 
evaluations of the Board of Directors as carried out by Maltese Listed Companies (MLCs) 
and to assess the importance of such board evaluations to small shareholders. 
Design/Approach/Methodology: The study was designed around semi-structured interviews 
with fifteen MLC representatives and seven stockbrokers, as well as questionnaires 
administered to twenty-nine small shareholders. 
Findings: The findings indicate that, while Boards of Director evaluations are carried out in 
MLCs, they lack the necessary formal structures that specify critical evaluation measures. 
Thus one may infer that those charged with the responsibility of conducting evaluations are 
not being well determined. By departing from the recommendations of the Maltese Corporate 
Governance Code on performance evaluations, MLCs have generally opted to resort to an 
inward and more restricted style of evaluation, doing away with external or independent 
parties in the process.   
Practical Implications: Recommendations include the promotion of shareholder interest by 
enhancing their awareness of the benefits they will stand to gain from the process and by 
involving them more in the process.  
Originality/Value: The paper considers possible evaluation measures that may be aimed to 
enhance both shareholder and public confidence in the exercise and also other ways by 
which it may be improved. It thus contributes to the literature, as yet scarce, which relates to 
corporate governance in small states. 
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Corporate Governance has long been associated with the restriction of “opportunism 
and self interest” that emanate from the agency relationship between shareholders 
and managers (Saravanamuthu, 2005). Ultimately, this onus rests on the shoulders of 
the Board of Directors (BoD) as its members are expected to act in the interest of the 
company. Furthermore, the BoD has the authority to determine the company’s 
strategic objectives, to provide the necessary leadership to materialise them, to 
monitor management, and to report to the shareholders on their stewardship 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
 
The wide capacity of the BoD shows that they play a “critical role in the success of 
corporations” (Mitchell, 2015). For this reason, directors are bound by duties to 
safeguard against their possible disloyalty and to address the conflict of interests 
between directors and shareholders (Ramsay, 1997). Nevertheless, the number of 
recent business failures and corporate scandals illustrate that the BoD does not 
always represent the interests of shareholders well (Hanson, 2002; Mullakhmetov et 
al., 2018). Under these circumstances, the BoD should not only be concerned with 
the performance of the company and its managers but also its own and one way of 
doing this is through board evaluations (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Morais Pereira 
and Candeias Bonito Filipe, 2018). 
 
Board evaluations enable boards to scrutinise and reflect on their current 
performance by incentivising them to acknowledge their strengths and weaknesses, 
and also the possible opportunities available to improve their performance (Rebeiz, 
2016; Humphries 2014). The BoD is a crucial internal control mechanism (Fama, 
1980; Jensen, 1983) and is one of the most discussed issues in corporate governance 
literature (Velayutham, 2013). Additionally, the focal point of most of the corporate 
governance reforms has been to affirm the importance of the function and 
performance of the BoD (Gill, 2013; Ujunwa, 2012). Yet surprisingly, very few 
recent academic papers have touched upon the subject of board evaluations 
(Agyemang and Castellini, 2015; Rebeiz, 2016; Suryanto et al., 2017).  
 
Various countries have put in place Corporate Governance Codes aimed at 
encouraging fair dealings and improving in the quality of information disseminated 
to existing and potential shareholders (Chhillar and Lellapalli, 2015). In Malta, 
following admission to the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE), Maltese Listed 
Companies (MLCs) must abide by the Listing Rules as issued by the Listing 
Authority, which require the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code (CG 
Code) on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis (Listing Rules, 2019). The Maltese CG Code 
is heavily influenced by the developments in the UK and the OECD (Bezzina et al., 
2014). The CG Code promotes the adoption of twelve CG principles, one of which 
being the “Evaluation of the Board’s Performance” (CG Code, p. 10). These 
principles were drawn up to serve as means to “enhance market integrity and 
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confidence”, ensure proper transparency in all dealings of the BoD and improve the 
protection of shareholders (CG code, p. 1). 
This paper focuses on Maltese companies listed on the MSE, which are the 
companies subject to the highest degree of transparency in Malta, and aims: 
 
(a) to analyse the performance evaluation of the BoD carried out by MLCs;  
(b) to assess the importance of board evaluations to small shareholders. 
 
The fundamental aim of this study is to add to the limited body of research that has 
looked into board evaluations from the perspective of a small state, particularly 
analysing the value derived from board evaluations for directors to small 
shareholders. This paper explores the ideal structure of board evaluations and also 
assesses the importance of evaluating directors on an individual basis.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Need for Board Evaluations  
 
Corporate governance deals with the accountability of those controlling the company 
to those who have a financial interest in the company. Thus, those in control are 
“held to answer for performance” (Licht, 2002). This notion of accountability was 
acclaimed by Andersen (2015) who emphasised that it is “the key concept in 
corporate governance”. Therefore, changes in corporate governance should strive to 
make “management more accountable to boards and making boards more 
accountable to shareholders” (Bosch, 2002; Chariri and Januarti, 2017).  
 
Since the BoD acts as an agent of shareholders and as a principal of management, 
agency problems may still arise due to conflicts between the objectives of 
shareholders and those of directors (Velte and Stiglbauer, 2012). This was also 
emphasised by McIntyre and Murphy (2008) since directors might be inclined to 
pursue their own interests, and as a result, “firm performance may be no better than 
if management had been left unsupervised” (McIntyre and Murphy, 2008). In spite 
of this, most companies evaluate the performance of their managers and staff, yet 
refrain from evaluating the BoD which is the peak body of the company (Epstein 
and Roy, 2010). After all, senior management might become more open to and 
appreciative of its own performance evaluation once the BoD sets the example and 
undertakes a board evaluation (Rebeiz, 2016). The design of an effective BoD is a 
continuous process and is facilitated by periodic board evaluations as they 
necessitate “active involvement from all directors” while also requiring them to 
“take their duties more seriously” (Rebeiz, 2016). Consequently, it would not be 
possible for directors to free-ride and simply rely on their name and reputation 
(Rebeiz, 2016; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, board evaluations affirm that the directors are fulfilling their roles 
(Spencer, 2004) and also send the right message to the firm and its stakeholders by 
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demonstrating a high level of responsibility and commitment (ICSI, 2013). The 
performance evaluation of the BoD is the “most effective tool for positive 
performance enhancement” (Beatty, 2014) as it helps in identifying skill gaps in the 
BoD, which in turn enhances the effectiveness of the BoD (Daily and Dalton, 2003) 
while also nurturing a spirit of unity and cohesiveness among directors (Kolar, 1998; 
Rebeiz, 2016). Such evaluations also assist in identifying and resolving potential 
issues before they reach crisis point (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005) and in highlighting 
areas that otherwise would not be discussed (Kazanjian, 2000; Garratt, 1997).  
 
D’Alessandro (2010) argued that through board evaluations, directors show that they 
are willing, able and ready to act in the best interests of the company. At the same 
time, such process provides current shareholders with “peace of mind”, while it 
encourages potential individual and institutional shareholders to invest in companies 
which undertake board evaluations. One of the duties of non-executive directors is to 
supervise the actions of the executives. However, the position of the non-executive 
directors is ill-defined (Jones and Thompson, 2012), and most of the time they are 
employed on a part-time basis. As a result, they may not have the technical 
knowledge of executive directors and may also lack the essential information to 
make informed decisions, hinting that they are not good substitutes for board 
evaluations. 
 
Ultimately, evaluations of the BoD are “a legitimate expectation of the shareholders” 
(Bhagat, 2008). However, it is important to point out that large shareholders control 
the company as their votes can change the composition of the BoD (Butz, 1994). On 
the other hand, small shareholders lack the professional knowledge (Ross and 
Crossan, 2013), and have “little power” and “no incentive” to monitor the BoD 
(Kandel et al., 2011). As a result, “each shareholder will free‐ride in the hope that 
other shareholders will do the monitoring” (Hart, 1995). Thus, the corporate 
governance framework should protect the small shareholders in order to induce more 
shareholder confidence (La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Despite the benefits companies stand to gain from board evaluations, their 
implementation has been slow (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2002; Heracleous and Luh 
Luh, 2002) and in some cases, directors even resisted such evaluations mainly due to 
the belief that such process might mess up the relationship between directors 
themselves (Kazanjian, 2000), and make directors feel uncomfortable (Kazanjian, 
2000; Garratt, 1997). Furthermore, while in theory board evaluations are an 
excellent tool, in reality there is a “reluctance to pull the trigger on a non-performing 
director” (Troubh, 2008). 
 
2.2 The Structure of Board Evaluations 
 
2.2.1 Party responsible for board evaluations 
Board evaluations can be carried out internally, externally, or else by the BoD itself 
but facilitated by external evaluators (Osborne, 2008). Internal board evaluations are 
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cost effective and enhance teamwork among directors (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). 
The party responsible for such evaluations can be the chairman, the company 
secretary or the chair of the nomination or corporate governance committee (Behan, 
2009). As regards to the Corporate Governance Committee, the Business Roundtable 
in 2004 emphasised that this committee should consist solely of independent 
directors and one of its roles should be to oversee the “composition, structure, 
operation and evaluation” of the BoD. Similarly, the CG Code recommends that 
board evaluations should be undertaken by “a committee chaired by a non-executive 
director” which then reports directly to the chairman of the BoD (CG Code, p. 10). 
 
However, the in-house approach is not favoured by shareholders because it makes it 
difficult to “ascertain the rigour of the process” (Osborne, 2008). In fact, external 
evaluators usually lead the evaluation process, particularly the feedback procedures, 
to ensure transparency and objectivity (Garratt, 1997; Kazanjian, 2000; Steinberg, 
2000; Humphries, 2014). The involvement of external evaluators enables 
confidential interviews to be carried out in a way that allows directors to discuss 
issues they may feel uncomfortable with (Collier, 2004), or as Walton (2014) calls 
them, “undiscussables”. 
 
2.2.2 Criteria included in board evaluations 
The criteria for board evaluations usually consist of the size and composition of the 
BoD; the independence and competence of each director; the performance of the 
BoD and the chief executive officer; and training and development (Ingley and van 
der Walt, 2002). Other evaluation criteria are the length and frequency of board 
meetings (Walker, 1999), and the understanding of the company and the industry it 
operates in (Sonnenfeld, 2002). These evaluations can also address succession plans 
and how the BoD communicates with the company’s shareholders (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2011). In contrast, more subjective criteria such as teamwork, 
and the value that each director is contributing to the BoD can also be included in 
these evaluations (Dilenschneider, 1996). 
 
Evaluation criteria can also be extracted from the corporate governance codes. For 
instance, the UK corporate governance code states that the “evaluation of the board 
should consider the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of 
the company on the board, its diversity, including gender, how the board works 
together as a unit, and other factors relevant to its effectiveness” (UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2014). The CG code mentions that the evaluation of the board’s 
performance should aim “to ascertain the strength and to address the weaknesses of 
the board” (CG Code). However, it does not delve into detail with regards to the 
criteria that should be used by MLCs to evaluate the performance of board. 
 
2.2.3 Communicating the results of board evaluations 
Daily and Dalton (2003) stated that the feedback and results of board evaluations 
should be communicated with the BoD itself, however, only the evaluation process 
should be communicated with shareholders. In contrast, Kiel and Nicholson (2005) 
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argued that the evaluation results can be shared with major customers and suppliers 
to further improve stakeholder relationships.  
The CG Code suggests that when it comes to the communication of the results of 
board evaluations, the chairman of the board should “report to the board and, where 
appropriate, to the Annual General Meeting”. Furthermore, the CG Code also 
stipulates that the “extent to which the self-evaluation of the board has led to any 
material changes in the company’s governance structures and organisation” should 
be disclosed in the annual report (CG Code, p. 10). 
 
2.3 Individual Director Evaluations 
 
Although the majority of performance evaluations concentrate on the BoD as a 
whole, there are also individual director evaluations. Humphries (2014) argued that 
individual director evaluations are important as the challenges with respect to the 
effectiveness of the BoD emanate from the competencies of the individual directors, 
and therefore such evaluations are capable of providing better and more immediate 
results. Daly (2008) supported individual director evaluations by arguing that board 
evaluations fail to identify non-performing directors. 
 
However, Tricker (1999) argued that in some countries, individual director 
evaluations are deemed to be inappropriate because the BoD is considered to be a 
team. Furthermore, individual director evaluations are a much more sensitive 
exercise (Vennat, 1995) and uniform criteria may be unsuitable to evaluate the 
contributions of every director (Heracleous and Luh Luh, 2002). For these reasons, 
Kiel and Nicholson (2005) maintained that consensus must be reached prior to 
introducing individual director evaluations in order to avoid serious conflict within 
the BoD. Additionally, Ingley and van der Walt (2002) recommended that 
companies should start off with board evaluations and then introduce individual 
director evaluations. 
 
With regards to the feedback and results, Daily and Dalton (2003) explained that 
feedback specific to individual directors should be restricted to one-on-one sessions 
between the director and the Chairman of the BoD. This encourages “more accurate 
and honest feedback throughout the process”, while at the same time respects “the 
confidentiality of the process and the individual’s integrity” (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2005). In addition to evaluating individual directors, the Business Roundtable in 
2004 argued that these evaluations should be connected with the nomination 
process. In fact, it recommended evaluations of individual potential directors prior to 
their nomination. In spite of the benefits linked to the board evaluation, the CG Code 
fails to make reference thereto instead focuses solely on the annual evaluation of the 
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2.4 Small Shareholders 
 
Baldacchino et al. (2016) argued that most of the small shareholders do not actively 
participate in AGMs. This low participation of small shareholders in AGMs is 
mainly coming from poor attendance from the small shareholders due to their lack of 
financial knowledge, and also due to the fact that small shareholders consider their 
rights to be rather weak, and therefore AGMs are merely a box-ticking exercise for 
them. Baldacchino et al. (2016) further explained that the rights of small 
shareholders should be enhanced to improve this situation. One way of doing this is 
by making sure that communication with small shareholders is “clear and effective” 
(Baldacchino et al., 2016). Better communication of meaningful information with 
small shareholders would help to transform the AGM from a box-ticking exercise 
“focusing on the fulfilment of the financial reporting legal requirements to one with 
meaningful and potentially far-reaching interactive discussions” (Baldacchino et al., 
2016). 
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
Empirical data was derived using a mixed methodology approach and from three 
different sources: 1) interviews with MLCs, 2) interviews with stockbrokers, and 3) 
a questionnaire circulated among small shareholders. This methodology enabled the 
analysis of both the internal views made by the companies and also the external 
views made by the stockbrokers and small shareholders. 
 
The first group of semi-structured interviews was carried out with directors and 
company secretaries of fifteen companies which have their equity listed on the Malta 
Stock Exchange. The aim of these interviews was to determine whether these 
companies evaluate the performance of their BoD and also to establish the structure 
of such evaluations and the reasons thereof.  
 
A second set of interview questions targeting seven stockbrokers was formulated to 
ensure that the study considers both sides of the spectrum. These interviews focused 
on the ideal structure of board evaluations and the reasons behind evaluating the 
performance of the BoD according to the brokers. 
 
An online questionnaire utilising a five point Likert scale where the responses could 
range from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) was also designed and 
circulated among small shareholders who were members of the Malta Association of 
Small Shareholders. A total of twenty-nine responses were received which enabled 
us to understand the value given to board evaluations by small shareholders and the 
ideal structure of these evaluations.  
 
The inclusion of close-ended questions enabled the use of descriptive statistics 
through the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). To check whether the 
responses differed among the three respondent groups (MLCs, stockbrokers and 
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small shareholders), the Chi-squared test was used in cases of nominal scales and the 
Kruskal Wallis was used in cases of ordinal scales. Furthermore, the Friedman test 
was used to compare the mean rating scores provided by each respondent group to a 
number of related statements. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 MLCs Evaluation of the BoD 
 
Prior to analysing the board evaluation process within MLCs, it was first necessary 
to determine how many of them carried out board evaluations. When the fifteen 
MLC representatives were asked whether they carried out board evaluations, a slight 
majority of 54% respondents claimed that they evaluated the board in a formal 
manner, while the remaining 46% stated that board evaluations were not carried out. 
 
4.1.1 Reasons for evaluating the BoD 
The MLC representatives that carried out board evaluations, along with the 
stockbrokers and small shareholders, where presented with a list of thirteen possible 
reasons. The MLC representatives strongly agreed that board evaluations should be 
carried out to demonstrate a high level of responsibility (Md = 5.00), to ensure that 
the board is fulfilling its role (Md = 4.00) and to improve the performance of the 
board of directors (Md = 4.00). 
 
Stockbrokers and small shareholders also agreed that (Md = 4.00) board evaluations 
should be carried out to address conflicts of interests between directors and 
shareholders, and ensure accountability to shareholders. On the other hand, MLC 
representatives neither agreed nor disagreed about this reasoning (Md = 3.00), 
resulting in a statistically significant difference (p<0.05). They argued that conflict 
of interest is not addressed through board evaluations, but through the audit 
committee or specific conflicts of interest policies.  
 
Furthermore, stockbrokers and small shareholders neither agreed nor disagreed when 
asked whether board evaluations are necessary due to the fact that non-executive 
directors do not provide sufficient supervision on the other directors (Md = 3). Two 
stockbrokers claimed that non-executive directors are usually ineffective as they are 
a minority on the board and usually foreign and too detached from the company. In 
contrast, MLC representatives disagreed with this reasoning (Md = 2), resulting in a 
statistically significant difference (p<0.05). The MLC representatives claimed that 
board evaluations are not carried out because they make directors feel uncomfortable 
(Md = 4) and also because there is a reluctance to confront a non-performing 
director (Md = 4).   
 
4.1.2 Importance of board evaluations 
When asked whether shareholders look at board evaluations before making 
investment decisions, 93% of the fifteen MLC representatives claimed that 
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shareholders simply focus on financials, mostly dividends and share prices. Two 
respondents further commented that small shareholders are either not educated 
enough to check the annual report for board evaluations, or else do not even know 
such evaluations exist. Interestingly, one of these respondents attributed this cause to 
the fact that shareholding is too dispersed in Malta and therefore the level of 
influence each shareholder can exert is too small for it to warrant such shareholder 
attention and activism. As for the stockbrokers, 14% declared that they refer to board 
evaluations, with one stockbroker recalling a case of foreign investment where the 
firm asked for board evaluations as part of the due diligence process. Comparatively, 
32% of the small shareholders stated that they check board evaluations prior to 
making investment decisions. 
 
4.2 Structure of Board Evaluations  
 
4.2.1 Party responsible for the evaluation process 
The MLC representatives that carried out board evaluations were asked to identify 
the party responsible for the board evaluation process. 63% of the respondents 
declared that this was the responsibility of the company secretary while 25% 
explained that the evaluation was carried out by the company secretary in liaison 
with the chairman. On the other hand, 12% of the companies stated that most of the 
tasks with respect of the board evaluation process were carried out by the chairman 
of the audit committee.  
 
A similar question was asked to the stockbrokers to determine who should be 
responsible for board evaluations. The stockbrokers mostly agreed that board 
evaluations should be carried out internally but facilitated by external evaluators 
(Md = 4.57). Two stockbrokers emphasised that companies should appoint a 
corporate governance committee composed of both internal and external people and 
such committee should be shouldered with the responsibility of evaluating the board. 
Two stockbrokers argued that an external consultant should be involved in this 
process to have an independent and outside view on the matter, whereas another 
broker explained that an external consultant would be particularly helpful if the 
company is introducing board evaluations for the first time.  
 
In the case of internal evaluations, the stockbrokers claimed that such responsibility 
should be borne by the chairman of the corporate governance committee (Md = 
2.71), followed by the company secretary (Md = 2.43), the chairman of the board 
(Md = 2.43), and finally the chairman of the nominations committee (Md = 2.00). At 
the same time, two brokers proposed that an independent body, such as the regulator 
or an ombudsman on corporate governance, should formulate guidelines on the 
evaluation criteria. A similar question was asked to small shareholders to establish 
whether board evaluations should be carried out internally or externally and the 83% 
of the small shareholders agreed that such evaluations should be carried out by an 
external party.  
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4.2.2 Evaluation criteria used by MLCs in measuring board performance 
Each board evaluation contains criteria on which the board is evaluated. Hence, the 
representatives of MLCs that carried out board evaluations were asked to identify 
the respective criteria included in their board evaluations. Additionally, stockbrokers 
and small shareholders were asked to give a rating to these evaluation criteria. 
 
The performance evaluation measures that were given the highest mean rating score 
by MLCs were ‘competence’ (Md = 4.68), ‘experience’ (Md = 4.61), ‘diligence’ 
(Md = 4.52), ‘independence’ (Md = 4.45) and ‘ethics’ (Md= 4.32). In fact, the 
majority of MLCs (75%) included competence and experience measures when 
evaluating the performance of their BoDs. Stockbrokers and small shareholders also 
strongly agreed that the performance evaluation should assess competence and the 
experience of the board. In contrast, the measure ‘structure, length and frequency of 
board meetings’ (Md = 3.42) has the smallest mean rating score, and yet it was still 
included in the board evaluations of all MLCs. When asked who answers the 
evaluation questions and therefore provides information on the board and the 
aforementioned evaluation criteria, all MLC representatives stated that this was done 
by the directors themselves. In addition, 25% of the MLCs also claimed that regular 
attendees of board meetings were also asked to contribute to the board evaluation. 
 
As for the stockbrokers, most of them strongly agreed that such information should 
be provided by the directors themselves (Md = 4.14), followed by senior 
management (Md = 2.71) and the Chief Executive Officer (Md = 2.57). On the other 
hand, brokers did not agree that such information should be provided by employees 
(Md = 2.29), stakeholder representatives such as customers and suppliers (Md = 
2.29).  
 
4.2.3 Communicating the process and results of performance evaluations 
Another key component of board evaluation is the communication of its process and 
results. When asked to whom the board evaluation process was communicated, all 
MLC representatives stated that such process is made public through the corporate 
governance statement. As for the stockbrokers, they all agreed that the board 
evaluation process should be communicated to the board itself, to individual 
directors and also to the company shareholders. Furthermore, 57% of the 
stockbrokers also highlighted that such process should also be communicated to 
major customers and suppliers. 
 
Correspondingly, when small shareholders were asked whether they prefer to be 
informed about the board evaluation process, the majority (72%) responded in the 
affirmative. When it comes to the communication of the board evaluation results, all 
MLC representatives stated that the results were only communicated to the board as 
a whole. Additionally, 63% of the companies also clarified that the results that the 
board has access to are anonymous and therefore there is no way to trace the 
responses to the respondent. Therefore, none of the MLCs communicated the results 
to the shareholders or customers and suppliers, however, one company pointed out 
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that in the prior year the external auditors extracted some information from the 
results of the evaluation.  
 
All stockbrokers were of the view that board evaluation results should be 
communicated to the board as a whole, to individual directors and also to the 
shareholders. Coupled with this, 71% of them also agreed that the evaluation results 
should be communicated to major customers and suppliers. One of the stockbrokers 
remarked that the process and the results go “hand in hand” and it would be 
worthless to know one without the other. When asked how the board evaluation 
results are communicated, all MLC representatives highlighted that a discussion on 
the results was always an agenda item during the following board meeting. Thus, 
none of the MLCs communicated the results of the evaluations through company 
announcements, the annual report, the company’s website or the annual general 
meeting. 
 
Stockbrokers were asked a similar question and they all agreed that there should be 
both a board meeting and a meeting with individual directors to discuss the 
evaluation results. Additionally, the stockbrokers argued that the results should be 
communicated at the annual general meeting (86%), published in the annual report 
(71%), made available on the company’s website (29%), and communicated through 
a company announcement (14%). Interestingly, one of the stockbrokers maintained 
that there is no need to make the results of the board evaluation public, as long as the 
shareholders have access to them upon request. As for the small shareholders, most 
of them agreed to be informed on the results at the annual general meeting (72%), 
followed by a company announcement (56%), published in the annual report (48%) 
and made available on the company’s website (40%).  
 
4.3 Individual Director Evaluations and its Extend in MLCs 
 
In analysing individual director evaluations, it was critical to determine the number 
of MLCs that evaluated their board members on an individual basis. When asked 
whether they carried out individual director evaluations, 40% of the MLCs 
confirmed this evaluation. 
 
4.3.1 Evaluation criteria used by MLCs in evaluating the performance of 
individual directors 
Similarly to board evaluations, individual director evaluations contain criteria upon 
which the performance of the directors is evaluated. For this reason, the 
representatives of the Maltese companies that carried out individual director 
evaluations were asked to identify the respective criteria included in such 
evaluations. Correspondingly, stockbrokers and small shareholders were asked to 
give a rating to these evaluation criteria. Stockbrokers and small shareholders 
strongly agreed that individual director evaluations should assess the ‘experience’ 
(Md = 4.55), ‘competence’ (Md = 4.52) and ‘independence’ (Md = 4.52) of the 
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individual directors. In spite of this, only 33% of the MLCs included these three 
measures in their individual director evaluations.  
 
On the other hand, stockbrokers and small shareholders gave the lowest rating score 
to the measure ‘bad contributions made by the director’ (Md = 3.71). MLCs were of 
the same opinion since none of them included this measure in their evaluations. 
42.8% of the stockbrokers highlighted that individual director evaluations should not 
distinguish between good and bad contributions made by directors as they are 
subjective and difficult to judge. Furthermore, these stockbrokers explained that 
individual director evaluations should focus on contributions in general to ensure 
that directors are not silent during board meetings. With regards to these criteria, the 
difference across the ratings given by stockbrokers and small shareholders was not 
statistically significant (p>0.05). 
 
4.3.2 Distinction between board evaluations and individual director evaluations 
The MLCs that evaluated directors on an individual basis were asked whether they 
made a distinction between individual director evaluations and board evaluations. 
83.3% of these companies pointed out that the individual director evaluations formed 
part of the board evaluations questionnaire. The same companies also declared that 
these individual evaluations were self-evaluations by the director himself. 
Furthermore, 50% of these companies emphasised that the individual director 
evaluations constituted a very small part of the whole evaluation.  
 
Interestingly, 16.7% of the MLCs did not carry out board evaluations but evaluated 
all the directors on an individual basis. These companies stated that every director 
evaluated the performance of each and every director through a questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the results of these evaluations were only accessible by the chairman 
of the board, who then held individual meetings with the directors to address any 
weaknesses identified. The stockbrokers were asked on the way individual director 
evaluations should be undertaken and they agreed (Md = 4.29) that individual 
director evaluations should be carried out internally but facilitated by external 
evaluators. In contrast, stockbrokers strongly disagreed (Md = 1.43) with having 
directors evaluating themselves.  
 
Stockbrokers also commented about the differences between evaluating the board as 
a whole and evaluating directors on an individual basis, particularly when it comes 
to the communication of the results. All stockbrokers stated that the results of the 
individual director evaluations should be communicated to the respective director, 
followed by shareholders (85.7%), major customers and suppliers (71.4%) and the 
board as a whole (42.9%). Additionally, 28.6% of the stockbrokers emphasised that 
“it is not prudent to name and shame in public” unless in cases of significant failures 
or issues that go against the law. However, half of these stockbrokers later remarked 
that ultimately the shareholders are the ones investing the money and therefore they 
should know whether a particular director is performing or not.  
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5. Discussion  
 
5.1 Board Evaluations 
 
The board of directors is the supreme body of a listed company and is appointed to 
act on behalf of the shareholders. In fact, this study showed that MLCs welcomed 
the idea of evaluating the performance of the board, and the research findings 
indicated that a good number of them carried out these evaluations. This shows that 
board evaluations are viewed as relevant and important, conforming with the views 
of Beatty (2014). 
 
5.1.1 What do directors think of bord evaluations? Are they useful or will they 
cause more harm? 
Directors refrain from evaluating the board since it makes them feel uncomfortable. 
This originates from the fact that the evaluations were all self-evaluations by the 
board itself. Additionally, there is a reluctance to confront a non-performing 
director, particularly in a small state like Malta where everyone knows each other. 
Confronting a non-performing director could be even more challenging if there are 
no performance evaluations in place. Directors also expressed their lack of 
motivation in carrying out board evaluations and regarded them as a burden. Being 
the highest-ranking authority in a listed company, the board has to ensure that it 
fulfilling its role in an effective manner. This study indicated that according to MLC 
representatives, board evaluations are not crucial as audit committees and the 
conflict of interest policies already attended to their purpose. It is to be noted that the 
strength of the board depends heavily on the underlying strength of its committees, 
thus significantly diluting the power of the board. 
 
The study shows that there are differing views between those who are being 
evaluated and those who are considered to be independent of the companies. As may 
be anticipated, the biased opinion expressed by MLC representatives showed that 
the controls currently in place are sufficient, while the independent view of the 
stockbrokers and small shareholders brought attention to the need for improved 
board evaluations and increased scrutiny. 
 
5.1.2 How should board evaluations be structured to ensure that they are 
beneficial for all the parties involved? 
A good number of MLCs are evaluating their boards. Nonetheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that such board evaluations are in fact effective. The effectiveness 
of board evaluations revolves around two things: who carries them out; and how 
they are carried out. For this reason, respondents had diverging views on the 
structure of these evaluations, leading one to ponder on such matter. 
 
5.1.3. Who should be the party responsible for board evaluations? 
MLCs opted to assign the authority of the board evaluation process to the company 
secretary. To this effect, MLCs eliminated the possibility of including external 
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evaluators to assist in these evaluations. In contrast, the stockbrokers acclaimed the 
idea of having a corporate governance committee, which in turn would enable the 
board evaluation to be part of its domain. However, it is critical that members of this 
committee are not involved in any way with the management of the company since 
having the management involved in the evaluation and appointment of directors 
would give rise to conflicts of interest and end up hindering the effectiveness of 
these evaluations. Thus, this committee could be composed of internal people, 
particularly non-executive directors, and also external people, such as the external 
auditor or an external consultant or adviser. The involvement of external evaluators 
or independent directors in this committee would induce more confidence of 
shareholders in the way the company is to be taken forward strategically.  
 
A more radical solution can be adopted when it comes to board evaluations. An 
ombudsman on corporate governance can be established, who will be, among other 
things, in charge of leading the evaluation process of all the MLCs. This would 
further enhance the objectivity and independence of the evaluation process as it 
would be completely taken out of the domain of the companies, Such a process 
would not permit the board to exert any kind of influence on the evaluation process 
and therefore, the board would not be able to use the evaluation to sanitise its own 
position. 
 
5.1.4 Which criteria should be included in board evaluations? 
It was revealed that the criteria that the board evaluations should mostly focus on 
comprise competence, experience, diligence, independence and ethics. This means 
that should these criteria be included in the board’s performance evaluation principle 
of the corporate governance codes, it would further increase the harmonisation 
among all the MLCs with respect to the contents of the performance evaluations. 
  
5.1.5. To whom should the board evaluation results be communicated to?  
This study also showed that MLCs only communicate the process of the evaluation 
to the shareholders and this is done through the annual report. Furthermore, none of 
the MLCs ever reported anything on the performance evaluations at the annual 
general meeting, and none of them ever disclosed any material changes resulting 
from these evaluations in the annual report. Under these circumstances the 
involvement of the shareholders is continuously being restricted.  
 
One can logically deduce that the board does not evaluate its performance for the 
benefit of shareholders. In fact, according to the MLC representatives, the two 
principal objectives of board evaluations are to plan training for directors and to 
improve the performance of the directors. Without any doubt, these reasons show 
that the MLCs are carrying out these evaluations to find ways and means to 
strengthen their current BoD rather than to criticise it or change its composition and 
structure.  
 
   P.J. Baldacchino, A. Camilleri, B Schembri, S. Grima, Y.E. Thalassinos 
  
113  
On the other hand, the stockbrokers and the small shareholders strongly believe and 
expect that board evaluations should be performed to provide peace of mind to the 
shareholders as the owners of the company. Unfortunately, this purpose is not being 
achieved due to the lack of communication between the MLCs and shareholders. In 
other words, if the evaluation results remain within the boardroom, there is no way 
for shareholders to directly benefit from these evaluations. Clearly, there is room for 
improvement when it comes to communication between MLCs and shareholders and 
the ideal communication channel would be the annual general meeting as this is the 
only occasion where shareholders meet directors face to face. Transparent reporting 
at the annual general meeting would give the shareholders the opportunity to analyse 
and gauge the results of the board evaluation process. This would give rise to a 
forum where directors would explain to shareholders the areas in which they are 
lacking as a board and would also present proposals on how they plan to address 
these limitations and better their performance. This would enable the shareholders to 
question the board on the evaluation results and communicate more with the 
directors themselves who are the ones in charge of running their company. This 
would strengthen the relationship between the shareholders and the directors and 
build more trust between both parties.  
 
The lack of strong institutional investors in Malta, who act as a check on the BoD, 
shows that the key for good corporate governance are the shareholders at the AGM. 
Nevertheless, Baldacchino et al. (2016) argued that the low participation of 
shareholders during the AGM is rendering this forum ineffective. With this in mind, 
one may ask, do shareholders really value the importance of board evaluations? 
 
5.1.6. Do shareholders value performance evaluations?  
The board evaluation is the only way for shareholders, mostly the small 
shareholders, to get a glimpse of what happens in the boardroom. This is even more 
significant in the case of MLCs as most of the shareholding is fragmented and 
therefore small shareholders are not able to directly appoint their own 
representatives on the board. Nonetheless, the main issue with this situation is that 
although the study revealed that small shareholders know about board evaluations, 
they do not make reference to them, neither before investing, nor when deciding 
whether to keep or sell their shares. Considering the fact that shareholders have very 
limited access to knowledge and information on MLCs, one may ask, why do 
shareholders refrain from utilising the information they have available? 
 
The reasons for this are various. First of all, according to MLC representatives and 
stockbrokers, lack of knowledge is the key reason why small shareholders do not 
refer to board evaluations. The situation stands to improve through associations such 
as the Malta Association of Small Shareholders. In fact, some MLCs are even 
holding meetings with this association to further increase and improve the 
communication with their shareholders. Secondly, small shareholders might not be 
utilising these evaluations because of their uncaring attitude. This apathy of small 
shareholders may be due to their low interest, low involvement and low influence. 
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This has led small shareholders to simply focus and concentrate on the dividends 
and share prices. Thirdly, small shareholders might not be making use of these 
performance evaluations because MLCs do not disclose the results of these 
evaluations. Simply knowing how the evaluation process is carried out does not give 
a lot of information to the small shareholders to make use of when making 
investment decisions. Therefore, this restricted access of information is forcing 
shareholders to disregard the performance evaluations altogether. 
 
5.2 Individual Director Evaluations 
 
5.2.1 Are individual director evaluations useful? 
When shifting focus from board evaluations to individual director evaluations, this 
study showed that small shareholders value the usefulness of individual director 
evaluations since they are the only way for them to know how much each director 
has contributed. Furthermore, individual director evaluations eliminate any ‘gloss’ 
appointments since they do not tolerate directors sitting on a board simply for the 
retainer. Individual director evaluations are beneficial mainly due to the fact that, in 
comparison with board evaluations, they address the weaknesses identified in a more 
direct and prompt manner since they pinpoint and detect an individual director who 
is not performing. Under these circumstances, both evaluations complement each 
other as they enable a lack of performance on all binaries to be identified and catered 
for. 
  
5.2.2 What are the problems with individual director evaluations? Why do 
MLCs find it difficult to evaluate directors on an individual basis?  
Although there are benefits to individual director evaluations, MLCs have been quite 
slow in implementing them mainly because the board is considered to be a team and 
is collectively responsible. As a result, it is assumed that board evaluations are 
sufficient and although every director has a particular role to fulfil, there might not 
be a necessity to evaluate the contributions made by each and every director. 
Another problem of the individual director evaluations carried out by MLCs is the 
fact that they are mostly self-evaluations by the director himself, thus giving way for 
subjectivity which renders the whole process ineffective. The fundamental problem 
of individual director evaluations in Malta is that it is culturally difficult to carry out 
performance evaluations internally. This cultural trait is particularly predominant in 
a small state like Malta; as everyone knows each other and most of the boards 
consist of the same people due to multiple directorships. Furthermore, internal 
evaluations make directors feel awkward and bring about the risk of having 
collusions between directors themselves. 
 
Therefore, while the involvement of external evaluators is recommended for board 
evaluations, this requisite is even more profound when conducting individual 
director evaluations. In the UK, ‘The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators’ offers a service to facilitate evaluations of directors. However, in the 
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case of small countries like Malta, external evaluators can be auditors, lawyers or 
anyone who specialises in corporate governance. 
 
Moreover, another problem of individual director evaluations is that the law grants 
the shareholders the right and ability to directly appoint directors, and does not give 
the company the right to refuse these appointments. Therefore, directors will remain 
on the board if the shareholders want them there, irrespective of the results of the 
individual director evaluations. Therefore as long as there is no way to enforce the 
results coming out of the individual director evaluations, listed companies will 
continue to put them on hold. 
 
5.2.3 Ideal structure of individual director evaluations 
 
5.2.3.1 Should individual director evaluations be tied to the nomination 
process? 
One of the main drawbacks of the individual director evaluation is that companies 
do not have a basis on which to enforce its results. This hinders the effectiveness of 
individual director evaluations and one plausible way to mitigate this drawback is to 
amalgamate and combine the evaluation process with the nomination process.  
 
Through this amalgamation, companies would implement a screening process prior 
to the appointment of directors to determine whether the candidates seeking election 
are competent or not. Then shareholders would choose the directors from the list of 
competent candidates to ensure that they retain the final say on who becomes a 
director. Obviously, shareholders would still be able to nominate directors, however, 
such directors would have to be subject to the same screening process. Such 
implementation would further enhance the effectiveness of the individual director 
evaluations since the results of the evaluation would then be compared with those of 
the screening process. Furthermore, by having both a screening process and an 
evaluation of directors, the company would be able to identify those candidates that 
are most suitable and determine the areas in which the board is lacking. 
  
5.2.3.2 Should the results of individual director evaluations be communicated 
to shareholders? What is the ideal communication medium that 
should be used in such situation? 
The sensitivity of individual director evaluations calls for prudence when it comes to 
the communication of the results emanating from these evaluations. In fact, all the 
respondents of this study were reluctant to name and shame in public. This is similar 
to the findings of Kiel and Nicholson (2005), which showed that the disclosure of 
results should respect the integrity of the directors. Nonetheless, the respondents still 
acknowledged the need for such results, or at least a summary report, to be 
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6. Conclusions, Limitations and Recomendations 
 
In this study we have identified that, while a good number of MLCs performed 
board evaluations, very few have embraced the concept of having a formal structure 
shouldered with the responsibility of evaluating the performance of the board, this 
making it difficult to identify how the performance of the board is evaluated and 
who performs such evaluation. The study showed that key measures upon which 
performance evaluationstake place are competence, experience, diligence, 
independence and ethics, thus meriting due consideration as to whether these should 
be included in the CG Code. Moreover, it was noted that MLCs are not involving 
shareholders in any of the stages of the evaluation process. This lack of 
communication thus hinders the shareholder ability to gain a proper understanding 
the evaluation process and substantially limits the benefits they stand to gain from 
performance evaluation of both the board and its individual members. Furthermore, 
it was identified that MLCs have no incentive to carry out individual director 
evaluations unless these are tied to the nomination process since the shareholders 
still reserve the absolute right to appoint directors irrespective of the outcome of the 
individual director evaluations. 
 
One of the main limitations noted is that the Maltese market lacks large institutional 
investors that can monitor and influence the BoD. As a result, shareholding of MLCs 
is usually made up of a few major shareholders, with the remaining shareholding 
being highly fragmented and dispersed among small shareholders. A key 
recommendation which emanates from this study is to broaden further the role of the 
MFSA or else establish an Ombudsman on CG which would provide guidelines on 
how to carry out performance evaluations of both the board and individual directors. 
One of the roles of such an authority would also be to educate the small shareholders 
to address their apathy.  
 
The MFSA could also be entrusted with restructuring the board’s performance 
evaluation principle. Such restructuring would include the recommended measures 
to be used in these evaluations and also the recommended channels of 
communication with shareholders when it comes to the results of these evaluations. 
The MFSA would then be able to carry out a more thorough review of the non-
compliance section of the CGS issued by the MLCs. This would increase the 
compliance rates or at the very least lead to better reasons for non-compliance. 
 
On a concluding note, in a small state like Malta, companies need to understand and 
consider the importance of communicating the performance evaluation of the board 
of directors to small shareholders. Furthermore, cultural traits prevalent in a small 
state, particularly with respect to the evaluation of individual directors in the context 
of an environment where names and familiar and easily recognisable, pose more 
difficulty in enhancing director performance evaluations and their transparency 
thereto. 
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